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Happiness without PowerALEXDEMIROVIĆGoethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main, Germany
Critique of Power‘No Power for Nobody’ was a moment in the self-understanding of the protestmovements of the 1970s, which the German band Ton Steine Scherben voiced with theireponymous song in 1972. The aim was to create conditions under which no one couldclaim power for themselves and, above all, no one could exercise power, because theywould be so constituted that there simply would be no power. This aim conciselysummarized in one sentence what was the subject of comprehensive criticism: theendless ideological discourses of politics, radio and television, consumerist privatizationand individualization, the smugness and narrow-mindedness of everyday life, theauthoritarianism of the institutions, the mendacity of democracy – all the fears andresentments, the restrictions and norms in everyday life, the constraints of the work andinsurance society, the bureaucratic paternalism and the anti-emancipatory orientations,the military and police violence. The great insight evident in this sentence was toidentify all these everyday practices as phenomena and processes of power. But is thisan insight – or not rather an anarchistic dream?The existence of power is not necessarily denied in bourgeois society; it is certainlyconceded that there is power – and not just incidental, occasional power. But most of thetime, it is seen as limited to the sphere of politics. Accordingly, people speak of a de-differentiation and over-politicization of society when it is observed that power extendsbeyond the political sphere. The emancipatory goal of a society free from power anddomination is derided or combated as a social-revolutionary romanticism andanarchism, as an unrealistic expectation regarding the possibilities of humancoexistence. So is it theoretically well-informed disillusionment when it is said that theaim of freeing ourselves completely from power is an illusion (cf. Mouffe 2000: 22)?Surprisingly, Michel Foucault’s analysis of power becomes the point of reference forsuch a disillusioned attitude towards power. With a severity that almost no one else hadused, Foucault challenged power at the beginning of the 1970s. For him, it consisted inoppression, repression, confinement and exclusion, power from above over those whoare subject to it. Starting in the mid-1970s, he then self-critically modified and specified
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this analysis and turned against the repressive hypothesis. He emphasized theproductive character of power. This was meant as an intensification of the critique ofpower; the previous critique of power was still too harmless, since it could be suggestedthat there was a point of reference for resistance in those oppressed and excludedpractices and forms of knowledge. Foucault radicalizes his critique of power. It is notthat an original freedom is restricted, as could be assumed in the liberal tradition;rather, the subject, the will, autonomy and freedom are constituted as a strategic level ofpower, at which its tactics, which produce specific forms of subjectivation and family,desire, governmental and sexual practices, are aimed. Astonishingly, in the reception,these analyses were understood to be affirmative of power, as if Foucault wereuncritically arguing in favor of minority sexualities, of forms of government or oftechnologies of the self (cf. Demirović 2015). His reflections on resistance wereinterpreted accordingly. The critical attitude as a virtue, as he reconstructed it for thetime at the end of the 18th century, appeared as a model for a cautious critique of power.Foucault himself, in the context of his deliberations on the emergence ofgovernmentality – i.e., of a historically specific art of government – puts it thus: At thispoint in the late 18th century, it was no longer a question of the radical demand, ‘We donot want to be governed, and we do not want to be governed at all!’, but of a morecautious form of critique: not being governed like that, not so much, and not by them (cf.Foucault 2007: 44). In the discussion of the lecture “What Is Critique?”, in whichFoucault presents these reflections, he considers the will not to be governed at all as atheoretical paroxysm of this will not to be governed in this or that way. “I was notreferring to something that would be a fundamental anarchism, that would be like anoriginary freedom, absolutely and wholeheartedly resistant to any governmentalization.I did not say it, but this does not mean that I absolutely exclude it.” (Foucault 2007: 75)Foucault does not reject the basic critique of power. He only opposes the assumption ofan originary freedom, and thus a certain assumption about human beings; secondly, heemphasizes that he does not actually speak to the radical critique of power. But he alsosuggests that a demand for the overcoming of power must not be a childish dream, butthat it would be an endpoint in which would culminate the many experiences of all thosestruggles that have been fought against all the technologies of power and practices ofleadership. Just as the local powers and tactics are condensed into complex strategiesand hegemony, there may also be an increase in that will which no longer criticizespower only with regards to this or that modality, but aims at the overcoming of power assuch. Foucault suggests this, it is, in his view, not to be ruled out, but there is also noinevitability; rather, a beyond of power would arise through the concrete power-criticalprocess. For this last turning point to be reached, the analysis must take full account ofthe complex strategies and tactics, the new dynamic and forms of power.
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It may be an anarchist ideal or a utopia, but the overcoming of all power is necessaryif the goal of social development is to be that human beings should not be degraded, notbe enslaved, not be governed by others. For whoever argues in support of theinevitability or necessity of power always argues in support of the fact that the lives ofhuman beings are in one way or another and to a certain extent determined anddirected, restricted, controlled, sanctioned, threatened and imperiled by variousindividuals. A compromise between these two alternatives is conceivable: becausepower cannot be removed from human life, but human beings strive for freedom, poweritself must be limited, pushed back, controlled and monitored, directed, civilized, sharedand sublimated, so that positive things may be achieved with its help – namely theestablishment of spaces of freedom and of protection. But such compromises alwayshave their costs and sacrifices; always certain people, their interests, their forms of lifemust be restricted, pushed back, or formed. Overcoming power also requires theovercoming of certain forms of life, i.e., requires the constitution of conditions underwhich the exercise of power over others is not necessary and possible. All would win,free, self-determined. The vocabulary for the new still follows the historical, survivingideas of emancipation. The question remains which forms of life are established, how thecollective coordination is carried out, what the semantics of a life free from power wouldbe like.Even if the goal of overcoming power in human coexistence may, on the one hand,be utopian, it would, on the other hand, hence be naive if the consequences of power, ofits dynamic and continuity were not taken into consideration. “Power is of itself evil”(1979: 67) – I would like to follow this argument by Jacob Burckhardt. But why canpower be considered evil? ‘Evil’, in spite of the distinctly moral emphasis, is hereprimarily to be understood as a reference to a defining logic, which itself still is relatedto unfreedom. Power does not remain external, is not an instrument; it affiliates itselfwith the actors who rely on it,1 permeates the relations and reflexively utilizes itself onitself. Why is power evil for Burckhardt? It is, first of all, external and internal violence:conquering, subjugating, enslaving, looting. This violence turns into force, has to becomelaw and takes the form of culture – but these moments remain subordinate to power.For Burckhardt, it would be unbearable if the evil were no longer regarded as evilbecause the people exercising power were pretending and, out of expediency, began toact good. For it would still be power, which, according to its own dynamic, tactically andstrategically, penetrates its opposite as well. But these people would still be inwardlyevil (Burckhardt 1979: 332). Power pushes for centralization, for the formation of aunified will, and lays claim to what is common. The evil of power is its inherent dynamic.For it wants to ‘round itself off’; in the supposed interest of the community, it expandsand encroaches on anything and everything (Burckhardt 1979: 332) – it does not
1 On this issue, cf. Ibrahim al-Koni’s powerful novel Das Herrscherkleid (2010).
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tolerate discontinuity. “Whenever a man – or a party – wearies, another is waiting totake his place, and though he may, in his turn, be extremely inadequate to his moment,the whole movement may crystallize round him just for that moment.” (Burckhardt1979: 233) Power reaches out and rounds off, in order to prevent the emergence of avacuum that could be occupied and utilized by another power for its own growth andcontinuity. “It is not a persistent force, but is a lust and ipso facto insatiable; therefore itis unhappy in itself and must make others unhappy.” (Burckhardt 1979: 139) Power isundoubtedly productive, but this productivity permeates, forms, homogenizes,disambiguates, fixes, and gives the further development continuity and a certaindirection which is to ensure the preservation and the increase of power.Such reflections on power can be disputed because they are based on the quiteproblematic assumption of a zero-sum game. The power which ego does not possess willbe appropriated by alter; ego must preempt it. Otherwise, ego’s freedom would berestricted and its chances of getting its will would be reduced. As Max Weber writes: “Ingeneral, we understand by ‘power’ the chance of a man or a number of men to realizetheir own will in a social action even against the resistance of others who areparticipating in the action.” (1978: 926) This is a liberal model, which is based on themodel of competition and contest: power is like a possession which ego can have at itsdisposal. According to this model, ego, in a competitive game, has opportunities it mustuse. If it does not seize these opportunities, there is the risk that other actors will reducethe opportunities of ego by their actions in order not to be disadvantaged. Hence, tomake sure that the risk for it of losing power due to the action of others does notincrease, ego must get ahead of them and increase its power at their expense, mustrestrict their opportunities for action. Thus, ego must preemptively take possession ofpower which would otherwise be appropriated by alter.Not to play the game of power is not possible, since power would immediately usethis attitude to increase its scope. There are two ways to react to this challenge ofpower: one is not to fall for power, not to be obsessive about power, but to neverthelessregard power as an unavoidable level of the social. It is a question of learning to handlethe relentless reality of power in an aloof and virtuoso way. Power leads to therequirement that we face this reality and develop an identity that allows us to practicepower. This is the by no means cynical Machiavellian point of view: to use powersometimes in a violent, sometimes in a civilized manner, as the case may be, but to notbe overpowered by power. The other way is more general, intellectual, and lessnegative. In this case, power is understood in a similar way as Marx conceives ofproduction as a “rational abstraction”:All periods of production, however, have certain features in common: they havecertain common categories. Production in general is an abstraction, but a sensibleabstraction in so far as it actually emphasises and defines the common aspects and
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thus avoids repetition. Yet this general concept, or the common aspect which hasbeen brought to light by comparison, is itself a multifarious compound comprisingdivergent categories. Some elements are found in all epochs, others are common toa few epochs. The most modern period and the most ancient period will have(certain) categories in common. Production without them is inconceivable. Butalthough the most highly developed languages have laws and categories incommon with the most primitive languages, it is precisely their divergence fromthese general and common features which constitutes their development. It isnecessary to distinguish those definitions which apply to production in general, inorder not to overlook the essential differences existing despite the unity thatfollows from the very fact that the subject, mankind, and the object, nature, are thesame. (Marx 1970: 190)Thus, a rational abstraction is a concept which emphasizes some common features inorder to be able to determine concrete practices, but which, in this generality, has littlemeaning and always requires a more exact historical determination. Just as humansgenerally have to work, it seems they also have to exercise power. This is to beunderstood quite positively. For humans have the ability to do something differentlyfrom how it was done before, i.e., they are capable of creating alternatives and in thisway influence the action of others; humans also have the ability to change things in theouter world. They have this double power over the outer and the social world.Power is everywhere, it is immanent in all conditions. From this, however, twocompletely different, indeed, contradictory conclusions can be drawn. In one case, itappears that, since power is everywhere, it can only be altered incrementally, and thatpower over people can be restricted, controlled, or reconfigured. But in no case could itbe eliminated as such, because this would amount to the elimination of humancoexistence and of the ability of humans to do things differently. In the second case, it isin fact a question of changing and eliminating precisely the social relations that areinterwoven with power, that are constituted by power, that reproduce power and arereproduced by power. This also means examining whether the way in which we thinkabout power and the conditions is not still determined by power, i.e., whether we aredealing with power/knowledge which forms our knowledge of power in such a way thatthe conditions do not become intellectually accessible to us, because our concepts aretime and again constituted and formed by power.If power is a rational abstraction, i.e., if it means something universally human, if itis connected with the human appropriation and shaping of the world, then thepossibility of a radical critique of power is cancelled. Heinrich Popitz (2017)distinguishes between four anthropological basic forms of power:a) Power as power over other living beings: the power to act and to injure. Humansare dangerous to others, they can threaten with violence, make use of it, they can injure,withdraw means of subsistence, destroy resources, or revoke membership.
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b) Humans can control, direct or lead the action of other humans. One means for thiscan be the threat of violence, i.e., the creation of alternatives of avoidance: obey, carryout my will if you want to receive a reward or avoid punishment. Horizons ofexpectations, fears and hopes are created which establish a long-term power relationbetween those who are powerful and those who follow.This notion also includes the idea of the contract: the expectation that others mighttake away my property or kill me is, as Hobbes says, already part of a war of all againstall. Because of this, the individuals give up their power and subordinate themselves to asocial contract. Once this has happened, the parties to the contract submit to no foreignpower, but to their own will, which comes before them as state power (cf. also Foucault2003: 89-100).c) Power is internalized. Individuals adopt attitudes, perspectives and criteria. Thebasis of power here is the anthropological need for orientation, self-esteem, certainties,symbols of proof (of one’s worth). This results in the power of those who set standards,i.e., who possess authoritative power.d) Power constitutes facts and data: the natural given is transformed to our benefit –a settlement is planned, designed and built, roads are built, a particular product iscreated, etc. This form of power is a power of the maker, it is mediated by and throughobjects and retreats into the invisibility of anonymous circumstances. But does the factthat humans always construct their ‘world’, that they always establish data, mean thatthis must always be power?It is certainly right when Marx emphasizes that men (sic), in order to survive, mustalways produce, and also that this general conception of production barely saysanything about the manner in which men produce and about the social conditions theycreate in order to make possible a certain way of appropriating nature. But is thisequally true of power? Would men not be able to preserve themselves if their conditionswere no longer a priori determined and permeated by power? The sociological analysisof power universalizes and states that power should be understood as analogous toproduction. But is that true? Is power necessary in a similar way to production, i.e., theappropriation of nature through labor?In fact, power can also be understood differently. Precisely because humans can actdifferently, they have, to put it paradoxically, the power not to act powerfully. Popitzsays this himself when he speaks of the power to inflict injury: “humans never must butalways can act violently; they never must but always can kill: by themselves or ingroups, on their own or within a division of labor; […] for all thinkable purposes.Anybody can.” (2017: 31) Power remains vague – everything could also be different:humans do not have to act violently, power exists, but is not necessary. One could also
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conceive conditions that do not generate power. Therefore, an analysis of the causes ofpower is important. For if one knows the causes, then one can not only limit power, butperhaps even make it superfluous.
The Immanence of PowerThe question of the causes of power is misleading. This question suggests a particularparadigm according to which power is a possession, a resource; someone appropriates itand has it at their disposal. Thus, means of violence, members of an organization,knowledge or money can be resources of power. This implies a separation between thesphere in which power comes into being but has not yet been applied, and another inwhich it is exercised; power appears as a more or less external consequence of theconditions, whereas the conditions themselves are not considered forms of power. Butpower can be conceived more generally. Max Weber argues that power is amorphousbecause “[a]ll conceivable qualities of a person and all conceivable combinations ofcircumstances may put him in a position to impose his will in a given situation.” (1978:53) Thus, power does not depend on such individual qualities. The amorphous nature ofpower is not a theoretical underdeterminedness, but can be understood as one of itscentral features: its apparent indeterminacy, its fluid character, the fact that it comesfrom everywhere and can be found everywhere. It cannot be derived, not from God, notfrom the economy, not from the state, not from men (sic), not from the means ofviolence. It is in the particular conditions in which it exists. Power and the socialrelations are coextensive. Following Michel Foucault, I will call this the principle ofimmanence of power. Since power is an internal mechanism, the conditions have to beunderstood as powerful.Precisely because power thus appears extensive and indeterminate, it is examinedmore specifically by the analysis of concrete conditions and practices. Max Weber shiftsto the level of authority. If power means “the chance of imposing one’s own will on asocial relationship even against resistance no matter what this chance is based on”, thenauthority is more concrete. For it is defined as the chance “to find obedience amongspecifiable persons for a command of a given content” (Weber 1978: 20). The distinctionbetween power and authority suggests the possibility of criticizing authority andrejecting forms of authority without immediately having to address and challenge themore indeterminate power as well. But authority is subject to the dynamics of power.When Weber examines authority, he does not call it evil. But, in substance, he is given toa consideration quite comparable to Jacob Burckhardt’s. For him, too, power roundsitself off. It is the modern power of rationalization, which, in a more and morecomprehensive sense, organizes the world in a purpose-rational manner, i.e., efficientlycontrols coexistence to such an extent that meaning is fully absorbed by it. In the end,
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everything results in so rational a world that free action is no longer possible. Therational arrangement of the social conditions itself proves to be compulsory for theindividuals. But he abstains from the value judgment that power is evil. For thisrationalized context appears as without alternative. But does the evil of power notconsist precisely in rounding itself off to such an extent that it appears as without anyalternative? Since it becomes coextensive with the conditions themselves, since itpenetrates the latter more and more and forms them according to its own logic, sincethe distance between cause and effect no longer exists, these conditions themselvesappear as no longer alterable.Michel Foucault remains at the level of power. Power, he suggests, means themultiplicity of force relations; the struggles which transform, strengthen, reverse theseforce relations; the support which these force relations find in one another by formingsystems; the strategies in which they take effect and whose institutional crystallizationis embodied in the state apparatuses, in the formulation of the law, and in the socialhegemonies (1978: 92-94). Power mechanisms, he argues, have to be deciphered on thebasis of a strategy immanent in the force relations (1978: 97). On this view, dominationis a final form of power, a particular way of coding power, a specific power relation;from this point of view, state apparatuses appear as “a concentrated form, or even asupport structure, of a system of power that goes much further and deeper” (Foucault2015: 229). Strategically, this means that it is not enough to criticize domination orsingle state apparatuses; so it is also not enough to control or smash them (cf. Foucault2015: 229). Emancipation must start at a local level, at the very bottom of powerpractices, and then work its way up to these final, more visible and official, strategicforms. Power, in turn, is never as aporetic as Weber says it is, because it is internallyalways related to resistance; it is never so powerful that it could separate itself from theforce relations.Thus, Foucault conceives of power as immanent to social relations. These relationswould not be what they are, and they would not reproduce themselves, if they were notpermeated and created by power. Power, in turn, does not exist elsewhere – in the willof a ruler or in a resource which is used; its cause is not to be found in social conditionsfrom which it is derived – rather, it is exercised “in all the depth, over the whole surfaceof the social field” (Foucault 2015: 228), it is effectuated in and through these specificconditions, of which it is constitutive. Foucault analyzes power with terms such as‘strategy’, ‘tactics’, ‘technique’ and ‘technology’. Techniques could be technicisticallymisunderstood as mere instruments. However, Foucault conceives society and itsdevelopment from the point of view of the emergence, refinement, diffusion of thesetechniques. In this, he builds on Marx:
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Social relations are closely bound up with productive forces. In acquiring newproductive forces men change their mode of production; and in changing theirmode of production, in changing the way of earning their living, they change alltheir social relations. The hand-mill gives you society with the feudal lord; thesteam-mill, society with the industrial capitalist. […] There is a continualmovement of growth in productive forces, of destruction in social relations, offormation in ideas[.] (Marx 1847: 48f)This reasoning of Marx has often been understood as technology-deterministic, but thatis not what it is. Rather, Marx suggests that the kind of cooperation as it is mediated bytechnology constitutes precisely the field of immanence of society. This anti-deterministic reading is also reaffirmed by Gilles Deleuze: “Types of machines are easilymatched with each type of society – not that machines are determining, but because theyexpress those social forms capable of generating them and using them.” (1992: 6)Foucault himself refused to submit a theory of power. It is precisely theobjectivization connected with theory that he rejects, as if the object of analysis hasnothing to do with us. Theory asks questions about the grounds and causes of power. Indoing so, it separates the social conditions and power; social conditions, power,authority appear as merely external. Although Foucault does not develop a theory ofpower, his analyses of power, which he pursued for many years, tend towards a certainsystematic coherence. Foucault himself did not pursue this coherence and did notexamine it as an internal connectedness. This connectedness of powers is, in turn,closely connected with the modern bourgeois relations, which, from this perspective, aredeciphered as power relations. In the following, I would like to explain thisconnectedness of the powers that Foucault distinguishes in his analysis of power.1. The first form of power is the power resulting from oppression, legally codedviolence, repression. Foucault observes practices of illegalism among the bourgeoisieand among the subaltern classes, i.e., smuggling, theft, highway robbery, idleness. For aslong as this illegalism was directed against feudalism, there was approval of thesepractices. This changed with the transformations of property relations in the 18thcentury. The bourgeoisie begins to fight the illegalism of the people. For it is the workerswho, because of their work and their connection with the newly developing apparatus ofproduction, are directly linked with the wealth of the bourgeoisie. They can steal fromthe warehouses, sabotage and destroy machines, render material useless, or reducetheir ability to work. In the emerging criminal law debate, a variety of grades of physicalpenalties are argued for. What is surprising for Foucault is that in criminal law, theprison sentence prevails and is accompanied by a multitude of paralegal processes.These include the surveillance of port facilities or factories by private police forces; themoral education of the workers by entrepreneurs and moral societies throughworkbooks, familiarization, saving or old-age provision. But in addition, criminal law is
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from the onset accompanied by a knowledge and a diagnostics which analyze andevaluate the perpetrators with a view to their reintegration into society. The judges, whooften back off from the severity of the judgments prescribed by the law, rely on suchpsychiatric consultants, who allow them to differentiate their administration of justicecase-by-case.In his analyses of power, Foucault does not specifically address administrativeprocedures, censorship, state of siege, police persecution, or class justice. He discussesthese power processes rather critically under the name of the repressive hypothesis. Onthe basis of his studies on penal authority, Foucault considers the assumption of anoppressive, constraining, levying power based solely on violence to be misleading,inadequate, if not false. In a way, this is regrettable, as there are numerous allusions topractices of violent state power in his work, be it medically assisted torture, executions,military and police violence part of combating demonstrations, class justice, camps, andforced labor. His analyses focus on the disciplinary techniques which paralegallyaccompany the formal repressive apparatuses and support their functioning. In contrast,the rationalizations and mechanisms of said violence, the specific power/knowledge-practices that come into play here, the juridical training and legislation, the strategic andtactical calculations in the use of violence as well as its function and mode of action,spying and spy networks, political persecution, the forced disappearance ofoppositionists, the reactions of the individuals subjected to violence – from fear, despairand self-abandonment to resistance and organizational practices – are oddly enough notinvestigated by Foucault. The administrative techniques of the modern stateapparatuses remain outside his view, too: the files, the bureaucratic procedures, thetraining and the knowledge of the administrative officers, the decision-makingprocedures, the judicial authorities, the techniques and practices in dealing with thepopulation, the police and military strategies and tactics of control and riot prevention.It seems as if Foucault considers violence, administration, and the law as somewhatboring and self-explanatory or already well-explained practices of power.2. Foucault puts the emphasis on another aspect of power. In his view, there is ashift in power in the course of the 18th century. The exercise of sovereign violence is notappropriate in the context of capitalist relations, which are only developing. Thebourgeois actors realize that they cannot govern people through violence. Mutilating,torturing and killing do not yet make people function and obey in their everyday lives. Inaddition, people become valuable because of their training, their labor capacity, theirskills. Also, far too many areas can be disturbed by disobedience and deviation: thethefts in the stockyards at the ports, the sabotage of the machines in the factories, thestrikes, the chains of command in military operations. It is no longer a question ofobedience to a specific command, but of obedience in general, a generalized willingnessto obey, the willingness of individuals to be deployed productively and to fit themselves
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into the rhythm of the machines. The sovereign power of law can only levy resourcesand forces, it can try to restrict action with prohibitions, but it cannot prevent it orpositively guide it in a certain direction. In his studies, Foucault shows how, in theschools, factories, the military, and the prison, a multitude of techniques of power – thecell, the examination, surveillance, the division of time and space, the analyticaldecomposition of bodily processes, and the conditioning – are combined into the greatstrategy of the modern disciplinary technology. The bourgeois class constitutes itself asthe ruling class with the use, the strategies and tactics of these disciplinary technologies,with their development, application, refinement, and interconnection. In these powerrelations, in the relations between the power techniques and the resistance, the socialclasses each take concrete shape. Through the practices and techniques of the exerciseof power, the bourgeois class gains knowledge of itself and of those over which itexercises power.With such an analysis of discipline as a strategic bundle of techniques Foucaultexpands on the traditional approaches of the unorthodox Marxist tradition. By this Imean, on the one hand, the approach of Gramsci, and on the other, the approach ofFreudo-Marxism. These authors realized that the bourgeois class cannot rule by forcealone. The military-police’s effort of surveillance, disciplinary measures, and persecutionis too high personnel-wise and financially. Large-scale and general practices are alsoimprecise and can disadvantage individual members or groups of the bourgeoisie.Moreover, the use of force remains unpredictable in its effects. For not only does it notprevent many practices of resistance in everyday life (which are not legally codified),but it can paradoxically also contribute to their emergence (through arbitrary brutalityor provocative activities of the organs of repression).a) Gramsci explained the fact that the subaltern accept the power exercised overthem with consent. The rulers create a form of universality which not only mechanicallymakes allowances for aspects of the ways of thinking, life forms, and interests of thelower classes, but also positively incorporates them. The exercise of domination iscarried out in a variety of apparatuses of civil society. In many of them, the consensusbetween the rulers and the subaltern is reproduced everyday: in school, in church, inmagazines and newspapers. Above all, however, domination consists in the fact that thesubaltern, through the organization of the social division of labor, i.e., through thefunction of the intellectuals in civil society, are deprived of the opportunity to work ontheir thinking and feeling and bring them up to the level of intellectual skills.b) Critical Theory, too, concerned itself with the notion that force alone is notenough to maintain domination. The authority of the powerful is accepted by the ruledbecause the former control the apparatus of production and, with their decisions and thecommand over labor, promise to ensure the survival of all. In this case, too, domination
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can be exercised in the name of the general will. There are, however, two reasons tosuggest that this general will contains a form of irrationality: first, the productive forceshave developed so much that nobody’s self-preservation and survival has still to dependon submission to the guiding reason of others; second, the productive forces and thewealth produced are used by the powerful as a means of destruction in order tomaintain their power in this way. Critical Theory holds the view that people certainlyexperience the state of development, but that they forbid themselves conceptual insight,since, in consequence of such insight, they would be compelled to oppose power.Psychodynamically, the libidinal energies oriented towards self-preservation thus turnaway from rational knowledge and invest authority positively. Knowledge, experience,inner insight must be warded off.With his analyses, Foucault develops a link which mediates between the analyses ofCritical Theory and the analyses of Gramsci. On the side of Critical Theory, heinvestigates the construction of the ‘soul’ as a target of power. However, he does notlook at the internal, socio-psychological and emotional aspects of power practices, but atthe problematization and rationalization strategies connected with them. The subject ofhis analysis are the disciplinary subject-constituting techniques which, beyond theimmediate work process, constitute the conditions of its reproduction. The patterns, thecategories in which subjects experience power, do not feature in Foucault’s work. On theside of Gramsci, and with regard to the numerous processes and apparatuses of civilsociety, as well as to the function of the intellectuals, Foucault’s analyses prove to befruitful because they broaden the spectrum of the apparatuses of power: hospitals,psychiatric wards, schools; he also looks at the order of the factory regime, the everydaylife of the wage-dependent permeated by ethical norms and prescriptions. In detail, theyprovide an idea of the processes in which intellectuals are active in order to develop,organize, improve or refine power techniques, and of how they thus contribute to thedevelopment of the modern power methods of individualization, the relation to thebody, socio-technical control, and the formation of habits.3. In his analyses of power/knowledge, Foucault arrives at a point where he goesbeyond the distinction between coercion and consensus, which is widespread in theMarxist discussion, but also beyond Weber’s distinction between coercion anddiscipline. The constitutional state restricts the action of individuals by means ofviolence, the law and administration. Discipline prescribes norms and assesses thebehavior of individuals from the point of view of compliance with or deviation fromthese prescriptions. When individuals do something forbidden or deviate from thedisciplinary norm, they are sanctioned to either prevent a mode of behavior in the futureor to improve, ‘resocialize’ the individual. In both cases, the individual is individualized.In the first case, the state does not claim to know the inside of the individual; it remainsagnostic. In contrast, the disciplinary technologies work twofold: firstly, they turn an
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analytical gaze on the individual and its body, dismember it into movements, into spatialand temporal processes, and train it, so that the body meets the productivityrequirements regarding learning in school, killing in the military, and working in thefactories with near-automated perfection. Secondly, they construct a soul in order tonormalize the individuals through a variety of psychopolitical strategies. From within,the individual sees itself as a subject who feels interpellated by the authority and whoknows that it is supposed to obey and conform. It is constituted as an obedience-subject,whose behavior is monitored, analyzed, surveyed, evaluated, and predicted. Despite acomprehensive refinement of the power technologies, which now become operative inthe capillaries of everyday habits, these two power technologies are faced with the sameproblem: they are both rigid and thus subject to the counter-circuit of power (cf.Luhmann 1979). This counter-circuit of power emerges because the individuals do notfollow the rules in everyday life, or do not follow them closely enough, i.e., theyintentionally or unintentionally disregard prohibitions or do not meet disciplinarynorms. Power has to react to these deviations. This can be done in a particular case andin specific contexts, but not when these processes become more frequent and occur inbroad social practices which are beyond direct control. The problem of power is that, ina certain way, it still remains too passive and acts upon the behavior of individuals fromabove.This changes with the emergence of a third form of power, which Foucault termsgovernmentality. It consists of a large number of institutions, analyses and reflections,whose main target is the population, whose most important form of knowledge is thepolitical economy, and whose main technical instruments are the security dispositifs (cf.Foucault 2009: 162). Foucault dates the emergence of the technique of security to thelate 18th century. This power practice operates in the midst of a multitude of events, andtherefore on the basis of frequencies and regularities. A statistically determined averageof events is defined as the normal: traffic accidents, right-wing attacks, floods, strokes,cases of pickpocketing, or drug-related deaths. Based on such frequencies, regularitiesand deviations are observed and measures are taken to return to an ideal normalitycurve of incidents. However, there are no attempts to prevent the occurrence of suchevents. Freedom becomes a function of security. It is not restricted or limited fromoutside, but security operates on this field of freedom and on the regularities which areobserved statistically. Power techniques are developed on the field of these eventsthrough analyses of regularities, statistical projections and expectations. The security
dispositif includes statistics, demography, hygiene and the health police, birth and healthpolicies.The dispositif of security also comprises a large number of apparatuses and safetymeasures: the management, planning and monitoring of urban spaces, the constructionof normal biographies, and the arrangement of collective habits and procedures (the
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establishment of hospitals and orphanages, the familiarization of workers); scenariotechniques that look at which infrastructures of society are particularly threatened, suchas bridges, power stations, train stations and railroad systems, airports, andtelecommunication facilities. Based on risk assessments, preventive measures areinitiated, exercises conducted, and coordination centers between emergency aid, firedepartments, disaster control, hospitals, and the police established (cf. Lentzos/Rose2009). In accordance with such scenarios and risk calculations, preventive security
dispositifs are created or refashioned: the surveillance of public and private spaces (trainstations, airports, subways, stores, streets, buildings) and the development of thenecessary software, which allows the automated identification of suspicious behavioralpatterns even in large crowds of people (at sports or cultural events, demonstrations orin station concourses) and which sets off an alarm in the event of a projected risk. Thebehavior on the internet and in the social media is watched and email traffic monitoredand searched with so-called ‘selectors’ (i.e. many thousands of keywords).In many respects, security refers to the technologies of disciplinary power and tothose of administrative and repressive power. This set of power practices, whichFoucault calls biopolitics, is aimed at the population as a biological entity. Besides thecontrol of births, family formation, hygiene, or the mechanisms of immigration control,the introduction of the modern social security system is one of the most severe forms ofbiopolitics, because this entails the construction of an extensive dispositif of normality.The courses of life are homogenized on a high scale level, structured according to acertain rhythm, and organized according to a normal distribution: with the entry intowage labor, there is insurance against risks of life: unemployment, illness, disability, andfinally pensions (often connected with the dependency of wives and children on theworking men). Thus, a certain expectation of normality is attached to the CV, i.e., theconformity of habits such as work, diet (meat, alcohol, smoking), leisure behavior(membership in a club, sports, television). Statistically, a certain number of sick days,hospital stays and a mortality rate are assumed, which also form the basis of financialcalculations, insurance contributions, and state measures. The first and decisive powerpractice is that of the subjection to a principle of solidarity, based on the principle ofinsurance. Claim rights to solidarity are not simply granted to individuals, but only onthe basis of past achievements and of a certain normality pattern of the homogenizedindividual life course, which is culturally and politically assumed and ratified bystatistics and the state. If deviations are too high, solidarity is called into question, too:non-marital relationships, of non-heteronormative sexual orientations, of diseases, inthe case of abortions or deviant consumer habits, in the case of too high lifeexpectancies. On this basis of new everyday habits in smaller social units, a new powerpractice was deployed from the 1990s onwards, which can rely on actuarial models:specific risk groups are identified, new classes of normality are formed and accepted (cf.Schmidt-Semisch 2000). They become a special target of commercialization strategies
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and moralization campaigns. Life forms that are associated with so-called ‘good risks’are encouraged, those with ‘bad risks’ are exhorted and subjected to extensiveeducational practices (diet, sports). The appeal addresses all those individualized in thecollective – they are interpellated as entrepreneurial free men (sic), who do not bindthemselves to a knowledge, a competence, to relationships, to an institution, to acompany.4. The discussion of the three forms of power mentioned makes it clear that there isan inner tendency of power to differentiate itself and round itself off, and that itsuccessively forms, generates, intensifies, and penetrates more and more areas – butthat, at the same time, it changes in this process, too. Foucault says nothing about theoverall dynamic of this power that rounds off. But its inner coherence is obvious.Everything suggests that the power technologies, their development, their expansion,and their refinement, constitute precisely the continuous-discontinuous process of themodern exercise of power through which the bourgeois class keeps on reproducingitself on ever higher steps of the ladder. Foucault seems to be suggesting that power didnot stop with the three power technologies of sovereign, disciplinary, and biopower. Inits own logic, power, in the face of ever new resistances, pushes for the expansion of theterrain of powers and for the discovery, exploration or formation of new areas ofproblematization and rationalization. Foucault observes a form of power which he oftendoes not clearly distinguish from security or biopolitics. Yet, this form of governmentalpower, of governmentality, is a separate and specific power practice. This power can betraced back to a long historical tradition, which, for many centuries, was particularlymediated by the Catholic Church: the art of the arts, namely the leadership, thegovernment, of people and their souls, which Foucault calls pastoral power. The pastoralestablishes the relation between shepherd and flock: the shepherd takes care of thewelfare of the flock as a whole, but he also takes care of every single member of thisflock. In the 18th century, this pastoral technique becomes the basis for a reorganizationof the administrative state. This state develops the modern Polizey, i.e., an apparatus thatfocuses on the well-being of the collective and constructs the sphere of economics, i.e.,the amount of grain, the number of workers, the imports and exports, the processes ofprice formation. Society is constituted and governed by the means of political economy.Foucault suggests that in the 18th century, pastoral power became an integralmoment of governmentality. But it cannot be reduced to this form of power. With regardto his deliberations in The Will to Knowledge on the practices of confession, with whichthe subject speaks the truth about itself, explores itself, observes its feelings, analyzes itsemotions, fixes and intensifies them, and binds itself to them, it can be said that thepastoral technology has developed into a comprehensive power practice of the guidanceof souls, which is condensed in a number of practices and institutions such aspsychotherapy, meditation, medical care, relationship talks and counseling sessions, in
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coachings or guided self-evaluations. Political strategies for addressing, fathoming andguiding emotions by politicians can also be counted among the pastoral technique, for inmany cases, leaders constitute a ‘mass’, a ‘herd’, to which they promise to look after andwhose physical and spiritual well-being they take care of.5. The power technologies presented so far constitute and form the conditionsunder which the power practices are carried out and the disputes about power andresistance take place. They are elements of the field of immanence in which the powerpractices, the power technologies and the social relations form a historically specificunity: ‘society’, economy, government, police, insurance, discipline, school, military,prison, factory, psychiatry, hospital, and health – they all form that whole that is modernbourgeois society. It does not make sense to speak of society and then of the hospital orschool, of society and of governmental practice, as if the one – the school, psychiatry –were derived from the other – from society, from bourgeois class domination – or viceversa: as if modern society could exist without the hospitals and the power practices ofcorporate domination, without social security, without the culture industry or disciplinein schools, and without the order of knowledge of statistics. But all these powertechnologies still remain external to the individual or subject. Foucault says that powerforms the soul and the body, that it individualizes and subjectivates. Power does notcontent itself; it also wants to penetrate into the outermost and innermost areas of whatis regarded as an individual – the undivided – or as a subject – which is autonomous andonly follows its own will. It wants to construct and individualize this subject, to governit, by permeating it, by structuring it according to its own ideas, by shaping it, byanalyzing its various impulses, acting upon them, fixing or intensifying them. One of thedecisive effects of power which make it possible to subjectivate the subject is thesexualization of the individual, i.e., the binding of the subject to a sexual orientation andcorresponding practices. According to Foucault’s analysis, this is done by means ofspecial technologies of subjectivation, as a truth-telling about oneself. By making theindividual figure out who it is, and in this process penetrate further and further intoitself, observe itself more and more closely, speak about itself, tell the truth about itselfin an intensive way, it binds itself to itself and to its identity. Telling the truth aboutoneself is a performative act, in which the individual constructs itself and binds itselfever closer, ever more intensively and of its own accord, to itself and to an identity. Thesubject is thus not oppressed, not hindered from doing something; these discourseshence do not serve the liberation of a sexuality, of a previously blocked will, therealization of a deeper subjectivity that was hitherto lying dormant. Rather, these aretechnologies of the self in which the subject constantly generates itself anew through aspecial relation to the truth-telling about itself. The technologies of the self, however, gofar beyond the binding of the self to a sexual orientation as the true identity of thesubject. The technologies of the self also include techniques of public truth-telling, of the
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relation to one’s own body, to diet or to the aesthetics of the body (conveyed throughsports, music and dance, or aesthetic surgery).Particularly Foucault’s analyses of power reveal that the bourgeois social formationis indeed traversed by an immensely broad network of power practices. Although hisanalyses of power are not carried out with such a claim, they make clear that there is aninner coherence of the power practices, which results from the fact that the powersexpand, relate to one another, complement and merge into one another. This happens incontingent processes and because of the struggles. In these, new types and techniques ofpower develop which work on problems that could not be solved by previous powerstrategies and tactics. Power rounds itself off. The five forms of power which Foucaulthas distinguished for modern capitalist society, and which have taken up and updatednumerous power techniques of the past millennia, do not by any means complete thedevelopment of modern power. Finally, an essential aspect of power is the intelligibilityof the relations themselves, which, in the face of this organization and expansion, of theintensity, the ramifications and interrelations, as well as the organic unity of power andknowledge, elude comprehension – or rather than elude, convey the impression thatconditions of a globally coordinated and cooperative coexistence are not at all possible.Indeed, the powers cannot be abstracted from these relations, as if they were not analloy but merely a coating applied to the surface. They are an integral, organiccomponent of the existence of the ‘social’ relations; if they were not powerful, theserelations would not exist, not reproduce.Because of its immanence, challenging power thus entails challenging,reconstructing, producing and constituting new relations. Therefore, the question ofemancipation is neither solely about the struggle against the state apparatuses, norabout an abstract struggle against power as such – but neither is it about atransformation of the relations which does not concern itself with the power permeatingand constituting them, just as if power would simply dissolve once the relations werealtered. The challenge is to reject the concrete powers and thus also the identities theyhave constituted. This power-critical practice should not be turned into the affirmative.There is no reason to hope that another modality of the exercise of power, anothermeasure of power practice, other rulers or other identities will appear better to us. Whyshould people resist if they must expect that the removal of the present powers will notbring about the better, but might also mean losing the good they may already havegained? The enormous number of power tactics and power strategies must be analyzedin detail, i.e., the relations must become the subject of the analysis regarding theirpower-knowledge articulation, in order to disarticulate the rounded-off power itself andto step by step completely dismantle those power technologies accumulated and refinedover the past thousands of years, so that no remnant of power will remain which couldthen once again push for totalization. This can only be achieved if relations are
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structured in such a way that the problems and rationality aspects to which powertechnologies provide an answer themselves disappear.
translated from German by Florian Cord
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